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Workshop Report
The differing relevance to social work education of 
secular virtue ethics; and of spirituality, faith and 
religion: Are these two confl icting perspectives?
Peter Wright1 and Paul Webster2
Summary: Virtue ethics challenges standard ethical paradigms about what 
constitutes social work as a morally right and good enterprise, locating the 
source of all morality in a person’s character. It posits that a virtuous (caring, 
compassionate, just and generous), social worker is one whose authenticity derives 
from what it is to be a true human being exercising such virtues. What it is to 
be a true human being is for many connected essentially with spirituality, faith 
and religion. The idea of characteristic virtue as a human defining feature is to be 
found in most religions and faiths. Virtue ethics locates this authenticity through 
a primarily secular philosophical perspective.
Both perspectives speak to what it is to be a good social worker but are they 
reconcilable? Does the secular challenge of virtue ethics to standard social work 
ethical paradigms also challenge the place of spirituality, faith and religion in 
social work education?
This report presents a conversation between two social workers about these 
issues, one a committed secular virtue ethicist and one personally committed 
to the importance of spirituality, faith and religion in social work education. 
The audience were invited to participate in asking questions as the conversation 
explored the complexities.
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Editor’s note: The following debate is reproduced in a form similar to that in which it 
was developed in the conference workshop – ‘warts and all’ - and not presented as an 
academic paper. It is offered as a means of engaging readers with the subject area and 
making links to their own practice, considering some of the arguments and positions made 
and allowing readers to grapple with the shortfalls, complexities and problems of ethical 
reasoning so that these can inform social and health care practices.
Introduction
This workshop presented a conversation between two social workers 
about the differing relevance of secular virtue ethics and spirituality, 
faith and religion. Each set out their respective positions on the question 
and the issues that arise from addressing it. Peter spoke as one who is 
personally committed to the importance of spirituality, faith and religion 
in social work education and Paul as a committed secular virtue ethicist. 
The following report recounts their individual presentations as they 
were made by them at the workshop. Practical constraints unfortunately 
prevented a more extended conversation in the workshop between Paul 
and Peter following their individual presentations but they set the scene 
for an interesting ongoing discussion on the issues in the context of the 
conference themes for the future of social work education.
Peter
Firstly Peter set out his perspective on the importance of spirituality, faith and 
religion in social work education, relating this to the place of ethics in social 
work education and of ‘virtue ethics’ in particular.
My position is three-fold:
1. that spirituality, faith and religion comprise a dimension that is 
critically important to understand, incorporate and address in social 
work education;
2. that this dimension is integral to studying and learning about ethics 
in social work education and to the formation of ethical identity 
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and ‘doing’ ethics; indeed, that studying and ‘doing’ ethics is 
meaningless without it;
3. that virtue ethics shows this relevance and correlation par 
excellence.
My short answer therefore to the question above, ‘Does the secular 
challenge of virtue ethics to standard social work ethical paradigms also 
challenge the place of spirituality, faith and religion in social work education?’, 
is ‘no’. My slightly longer answer is ‘no it should not, there should be no 
confl ict if it is understood that ‘secular’ does not preclude spirituality; 
that spirituality, faith and religion are central to social work education; 
and that spirituality (including faith and religion but not bound or 
defi ned by either) is central to ethics’.
Some preliminary remarks are important to make. I’m delighted this 
conference has been organised to address what is for me the critical 
importance of faith, spirituality and religion in social work education. 
My own faith is something that is crucial to me. I have been in social 
work for 35 years and social work education for about 25 of those years 
and to have this topic on the agenda in this way is a great relief, it seemed 
to me it almost couldn’t be talked about it openly in years before.
In terms of my own faith I am a Christian but my concern is with the 
importance of these dimensions for educators and students of all faiths 
and none, and of all religions and none, and however we apprehend 
the notion and experience of ‘spirituality.’
I will underline this later when talking more about spirituality but 
share now that the Christian faith which for me gives focus, shape and 
meaning to ‘spirituality’ is one I’ve had for over 40 years. In multi-faith 
discussions I don’t say I ‘happen’ to be a Christian because in my 
experience it wasn’t, and isn’t, happenchance. However, I think that 
maybe like very many people who have a Christian faith I did not have 
a single dramatic ‘conversion’ experience; I can’t tell you a date or time 
or place but it was more out of a process of refl ection over a few years 
in my teens and early twenties. Rather than my ‘fi nding’ faith it’s more 
true to say that faith found me and God has a lot of work to do in me yet.
For me, faith is not like an on-off electric switch, like you’ve either 
got it full on or not at all. In reality it’s more like a ‘dimmer’ switch 
throughout life and it changes. In my experience, if I look back over 
the years it’s not always exactly the same; the faith of a young man or 
woman is not necessarily like that of an older man or woman; faith 
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does grow and change as we grow and change in life; the same faith 
may be different when you’re in love or dying or bereaved for example. 
I say this because, as I will discuss later, this is true also of spirituality 
which in reality has certain fl uidity about it. This is important when we 
come to think about the relevance of spirituality to ethics, to studying 
and learning about ethics, to the formation of ethical identity and for 
‘doing’ ethics.
I also mention my own faith now because when discussing 
spirituality, faith and religion in general I have to draw on illustrations 
and metaphors from the faith and religion I know just because it is the 
one I know about and not because I have any one-faith agenda; I am 
just not equipped to draw on illustrations from other faiths or religions 
and hope I would not be presumptuous or pretentious to try.
I continue now in three sections. Firstly I will rehearse briefl y why 
the importance of spirituality, faith and religion in social work education 
is so critical. Secondly I will explain the relevance of spirituality, faith 
and religion for studying ethics, to the formation of ethical identity 
and for ‘doing’ ethics in social work education. Lastly, I will show this 
correlation in relation to virtue ethics in particular.
1. Why the importance of spirituality, faith and religion in social work education 
is so critical
I will not dwell too much on why it is so critical that spirituality, faith 
and religion is incorporated and given serious, systematic attention 
in social work education as those reasons are the stated incentives 
for this conference and have been rehearsed elsewhere but I do wish 
to highlight some of them. We ignore this importance at our peril as 
educators because, for example:
• Religion and faith matter to a signifi cant proportion of the UK 
population (the 2001 Census reported that ¾ of the population 
claimed to have a religion, 71% Christian). One course leader at 
this conference has said that 60% of his last intake was active in a 
religious faith of one kind or another.
• Religion and faith are increasingly prominent in public life. People 
of faith are no longer content to keep it private or keep it at home. 
From dress or the wearing of symbols at work and so on, through 
to religious extremism it’s in public life as never before. It is clear 
that for some members of society their faith identity is of paramount 
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importance but others are not sure what this means for themselves, 
how are they to understand this fact, how are they to respond?
• Related to this is a strand of fear in society about religion and 
faith. If educators and students are not equipped to deal with this 
dimension then a vacuum of uncertainty and ignorance will be fed 
by stereotyping and maybe even unexamined fundamentalism on 
courses. Otherwise why should those who populate social work 
courses at any one time be any different from the general population 
in these respects? Incidentally, ‘out there’ this fear can be found 
in anything from, for example, a backlash against faith schools 
of all kinds, so-called Islamophobia, the apparent rise of militant 
atheism and the popularity of the writings of Richard Dawkins 
or Christopher Hitchens. Dawkins is a most entertaining writer 
and a good swashbuckling read but regardless of the content of 
his arguments I think he does feed into a general fear of faith and 
religion which is ‘out there’ these days.
• Refl ective practitioners need to be able to locate themselves in the 
context of faith, religion and spirituality no less than in the context 
of race, class, gender or sexuality for example. It took a decade for 
us to take race on board, beginning with the anti-racist and anti-
discriminatory developments and struggles of the 1980s and early 
1990s; it’s time for us to think similarly about spirituality, faith and 
religion as part of the reality of life and people’s lives. I sense or at 
least hope that perhaps the time for this has now come as the time 
of anti-racism and anti-discrimination came before (and is now 
mainstream in social work education; it wasn’t always so).
• There is an increasing emphasis on holistic assessments and care 
in health and care services that recognise that quality in life also 
equates to the meaning of life but other disciplines, particularly in 
mental health are more advanced in including faith, religion and 
spirituality in assessments than is social work.
• Spirituality is universal. It includes faith and religion but is not 
bound or defi ned by either. Spirituality therefore applies to all 
involved in social work education including those who may 
have no religious background or affi liation or no shared religious 
background.
2. The relevance and correlation of spirituality, faith and religion for studying ethics, 
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to the formation of ethical identity and for ‘doing’ ethics in social work education;
Now, to see the relevance of spirituality faith, religion to ethics in 
social work and social work education it is necessary to be clear at 
the outset about what we mean by these fi rst set of terms and I will 
concentrate most on spirituality and its correlation with ethics. This is 
because while for some people their ‘spirituality’ is given meaning and 
is articulated by a faith (which may in turn be formalised in a religion), 
it is important to reiterate that spirituality applies to all of us, people 
of all faiths and none. Incidentally, if you Google ‘atheist spirituality’ 
you get nearly half a million hits; if you Google ‘humanist spirituality’ 
you get over half a million hits and ‘Googling’ ‘secular spirituality’ gets 
over two million hits.
My point to be underlined here is that spirituality is universal. It 
is an essential component of humanity, an essential aspect of lived 
experience. Importantly for understanding its correlation with learning 
about ethics and for the formation of ethical identity or ‘doing ethics’ 
it involves us in:
• Developing awareness and appreciation of the other;
• Developing capacity to respond to the other;
• Developing ultimate life meaning based upon awareness and 
appreciation of and response to the other. (The ‘other’ in this context 
may be the other person and/or other people and/or nature and/or 
the environment.)
Incidentally, although I have held the notions I am setting out here 
for a very long time, I was delighted to come across at least some of 
them being refl ected in a recent book by Simon Robinson, Spirituality, 
Ethics and Care which I’d recommend if you are generally interested in 
this area.
The ‘spirit’ of spirituality is energy like the wind or breath or wind of 
life which animates our awareness and responsiveness and refl ections. 
These may not necessarily be ultimately for good outcomes but it is 
important to note at the outset that moral responsibility lies at the heart 
of spirituality. I will expand on this core point later.
Spirituality can be communal. We talk of a ‘team’ spirit or a 
‘community’ spirit. Spirituality has a transcendent quality but is not 
removed from earthly life at all.
The important thing, however, is that spirituality is essentially 
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relational and refl ective. It is a creative, dynamic experience and 
dimension to life. Spirituality is not statically framed by set beliefs. It 
involves learning, growth and change as we develop awareness and 
appreciation of the other, as we refl ect on meanings and implications 
for our values and beliefs and our response to the other.
For an example consider how our attitudes to the environment have 
changed and developed over the last few decades. As we have developed 
awareness and appreciation of the environment and importantly as we 
have refl ected on our relationship to the environment and the meanings 
and implications of this for our values and beliefs and our response to 
the environment, i.e. this particular ‘other’, then so our attitudes have 
changed. This is as much communal spirituality at work as rationality. 
Note that scientifi c information about the damage we have been doing 
to the environment has been available and known for much, much 
further back in time without any effect on our behaviour before.
It follows that our spirituality is a dimension of life to be worked 
through all the time, even wrestled with. As we are animated by our 
spirituality to refl ect on our values and beliefs about life we are at 
the same time working through and wrestling with morality. At the 
heart of spirituality and our spiritual journeys are moral questions 
that arise from our awareness and appreciation of the other and our 
responsiveness to the other.
My key point here is that spirituality therefore provides the 
framework for ethics. I would go so far as to say that it is central to 
ethics. It is not therefore ever a question of spirituality OR ethics but of 
spirituality AND ethics. They are neither separate dimensions, nor even 
should be separated academically although in Universities they may 
have historically become so as academic territories became artifi cially 
demarcated in academic institutions but this is no guide to their true 
correlation.
Like the spirituality that gives it a framework, ethics too are worked 
out in lived experience. Ethical deliberations are essentially situational. 
We are making moral meaning all the time. Ethics is not a neutral 
objective activity but takes place in lived experience in the context of 
our values and beliefs about life – which may or may not be religious 
beliefs. Morality without spirituality is sterile. Spirituality without 
morality is self indulgent.
Spirituality is not therefore some ontological basis from which 
ethical meaning is separately developed but is the framework in which 
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ethics can be worked through, ethical choices made, values and beliefs 
re-examined, and changed. It is through our spirituality that ethical 
refl ection can occur as it does in real life. We don’t ‘do’ ethics best, 
particularly in social work education and particularly in practice – 
based learning in real situations, by reaching for philosophical rules 
for ethical decision-making or for developing an ethical social work 
identity from cognitive doctrines. Ethical choices and decisions don’t 
emerge seamlessly from set cognitive doctrines. The reality is that they 
are essentially worked out in lived experience, we make moral meaning 
all the time by wrestling with - working through - the complexities 
of diversity and tradition, particularly in values and beliefs about life.
Now, those who look primarily if not exclusively to how the purely 
philosophical, ‘rational’ schools of thought on ethics, from Plato to 
the post-Enlightenment schools and to most recent thinkers, to help 
us decide what is the right thing to do, or for what is the ‘ethical’ 
intervention in social work practices might not think immediately 
of spirituality as the framework for thinking about or doing ethics in 
practice.
The concept of spirituality may indeed be frustrating to the rational 
ethical philosopher, probably sounding to him or her rather vague 
and elusive. True, it is understood as much by imagination, poetry, 
intuition, metaphor, or art (and maybe for some, prayer or meditation) 
and is discovered most vividly, for example, in moments of laughter or 
joy or despair. But it is not non-rational. It is about the real world and 
is experienced in the real world. It involves and requires reasoning in 
and about that world. Its transcendence lies in that it moves beyond 
pure self awareness but is not removed from real life.
Ethics does not proclaim an objective world ‘out there’. It concerns a 
subjective world within us; we are mind body and spirit. As the publicity 
and aims of this Conference event state clearly – ‘We are all infl uenced by 
spirituality, faith and religion’ to which I would add – ‘to put it mildly’.
Of course, to some limited extent in terms of its usefulness in social 
work education the study of ethics, I admit, we can say that ethics 
doesn’t necessarily need spirituality. It is perfectly possible to study 
ethics with great erudition and depth without considering spirituality 
or faith or religion. I certainly do not fall into the trap of saying that 
ethics needs religion or that ethics must fl ow from religious systems; 
this is patently not true any more though it may have been once long 
ago for the ancients. But I will say that the study and ‘doing’ of ethics 
Workshop Report: Secular virtue ethics; and spirituality, faith and religion
105 Journal of Practice Teaching & Learning 8(3) 2008, 97-114. DOI: 10.1921/146066909X478956. © w&b
that disregards a spiritual framework is signifi cantly the poorer for it 
and my contention is that for this paucity it is sadly meaningless for 
practice in the real world of everyday ethics.
It is also worth pointing out as well that a sense of spirituality can 
admit to acknowledgement of the sacred in life especially the sacredness 
of life that purely rational ethics or the ethical language of human 
rights alone cannot adequately speak to. For example for a person to be 
tortured is surely, to say the very least of it, a violation of the dignity of 
that person’s life. And philosophy will be able to rationally study and 
evaluate the ethics and rights of that on a case basis and maybe support 
a consensus on the wrongness of that act but what more, what beyond 
this - for all of us - and for life itself - is violated by that act?
Alasdair McIntyre - a virtue ethicist - describes the moral life in 
terms of its direction towards the ultimate end or goal which is the 
contemplation of and union with the source of our being and becoming. 
It is our spirituality that animates and enables that direction.
3. What about ‘virtue ethics’- how do ‘virtue ethics’ particularly illustrate the 
relevance and correlation of spirituality to ethics.
So, spirituality is central to ethics and is the framework for doing ethics 
in living situations. This applies generally but where does the mission, 
the work and the values of a caring profession such as social work fi t 
in? In other words the key question is - what is the bridge for a social 
worker between morality and spirituality?
The bridge is the concept, the idea and the practice of virtue. The 
idea of virtue suggests goodness, which is something that lies beyond 
just doing one’s duty. But here is where I locate virtues: virtues are 
the qualities of a person that enable a moral person to be brought into 
being; and for our purposes moral virtues enable a moral vision. In fact 
virtues don’t make sense without a moral vision
The virtues of social work I would say you can detect in codes of 
practice (although maybe that’s not the most fertile or meaningful place 
for them) and in social work literature. I can even still remember reading 
these in Felix Biesteck’s book The Casework Relationship as a social work 
student many years ago and in others.
Now, virtues are embraced in the concept or ‘umbrella’ of love, a 
word not often admitted into social work education probably for good 
reason given it’s a word that is overworked everywhere to the point 
of meaningless. But I mean love as recognised by the Greek word 
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‘agape’ - in social work this is the overarching and defi ning virtue. We 
were asked in this conference earlier to say what the soul of social work 
is – for me this is it.
‘Agape’ is a word that is found in the New Testament. It may be 
found in other religious scriptures as well but this is the one I know. 
It describes a love which is unconditional, that is open, sacrifi cial 
and given freely with no self-interest other than for the welfare of the 
other. For Christians at least, Jesus Christ epitomises agape love. For 
our purposes ‘agape’ expressed through social care can be seen as 
constant (i.e. not capricious or dependent on response), unconditional, 
prepared to take risks (i.e. it is not a calculated giving), empathetic, 
courageous, and having personal and professional integrity. There 
is an inherent vulnerability in offering agape love. It has a lot about 
it that we might recognise in social work principles. Agape is, in the 
social care context, a concept and an attitude as well as a virtue. It is 
based on a kind of covenant with fellow human beings purely because 
they are fellow human beings; it is not based on any contractual 
agreements - that would be conditional. Incidentally this sits awkwardly 
with contract- based social work; where is the covenant-based soul of 
social work there? It recognises in the other an a priori responsibility in 
which the giver develops awareness and appreciation of the other and 
develops capacity to respond to the other, which I said earlier were key 
components in the defi nition of spirituality.
When we see how agape works, we can see that it is entirely bound up 
with spirituality, or how spirituality ‘works’ if you like. The attributes of 
agape love, not least its unconditional and empathetic nature, demand 
engagement with the human condition for itself to the extent that 
ethics cannot ultimately be worked out in abstract, as it were, but are 
essentially worked through, and wrestled with, in living situations. 
Spirituality, the framework for ‘doing’ ethics, animates this. So, in other 
words, for the social worker to exercise the gift of agape with all its 
virtues is to engage his or her own spirituality in a working through, a 
wrestling with, the ethics of whatever the situation is.
Virtues in this way can’t be charted in a straight line from doctrine 
or philosophical rule to outcome. Nor are they explicitly aimed at, so 
much as they are developed; they arise out of an agape journey.
To sum up, spirituality, faith and religion are central to social work 
education. Spirituality (including faith and religion but not bound 
or defi ned by either), is central to ethics. There should be no confl ict 
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between spirituality and ethics. Virtue holds them together in social 
work practice. Any teaching or learning on ethics, including ‘virtue 
ethics’, that ignores or rejects the spiritual dimension in social work 
education is impoverished to its detriment.
Paul
Then Paul set out his perspective as a committed secular virtue ethicist.
I have the following three questions:
1. What actually motivates a social worker to become a social worker 
(source, purpose, rationale, telos)?
2. What is (proper) ethical social work identity?
3. What do these questions mean for direct practice including practice 
learning: and how do motivation and identity transform themselves 
into real action?
Ostensibly we, Peter and I, are at the opposite ends of the spectrum: I 
am a committed atheist with a Marxist tendency and, as I understand it, 
Peter is a committed Christian. Whatever else, we have some apparent 
common ground – what is it to be an authentic human being and, in 
particular, a good, that is a moral, person. We speak to this commonality 
through our own perspectives. One of my particular theoretical 
interests is in virtue ethics as a paradigm of moral action. If we speak 
of virtue and virtuous behaviour or actions we must speak of vice and 
viciousness. There is much that is vicious today in our material world 
and also in just how we relate to people and, indeed, in my view that 
viciousness characterises much of what now passes as social work. 
Social work practice with its technical rationalities, disciplines and 
governance has been grossly distorted by the homage to market values 
and the neo-liberal and neo-conservative cults of anti-social selfi sh 
individualism. It is as if the market can solve the problems it throws up 
and needs to sustain itself, yet social work is being organised to replicate 
that viciousness, not assuage it. Ethical goods are not to be found in the 
free-for-all market place of competitiveness and individual striving but 
in harmony, cooperation, solidarities and the intrinsic value of other 
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human beings. So let us explore together what it is to be a social worker 
from virtue ethicist and a faith and spirituality perspectives.
Virtue ethics(VE)
There has been a call in philosophy for a return to the ethics of virtue 
ever since philosophers savagely deconstructed the follies of modern 
ethical paradigms, that is to say those abstract, grandiose meta-laws of 
ethics that have applied top down to moral quandaries or dilemmas 
(Kantianism and the Utilitarianism.) VE as a bottom up counter 
discourse of particularity is now more or less mainstreamed as a rival to 
deontic and consequentialist perspectives offering different, sometimes 
competing, insights into the challenges of moral thinking. However, VE 
has never really percolated down into mainstream social work ethical 
discourse and only now is it only just beginning to do so. As with faith 
and spirituality motifs, VE forms part of a revived ‘movement of hope’ 
in social work, to rescue ourselves from our moral miasma and our fall 
from grace. Kantian and Utilitarian ethical reasoning has dominated 
social work value discourse but has failed to hold back the neo-liberal 
and neo-conservative onslaught.
According to Rachels (The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 1999) virtue 
ethical discourse must do the following:
• explain what a virtue is
• list the character traits that are virtues
• explain what these traits mean
• explain why these traits are desirable
• address whether virtues are the same for everyone or differ from 
person to person or culture to culture, society to society
We would perhaps need to make this discourse social work specifi c 
and say just why it is relevant for a social work practice of value. I am 
going to leave this to the audience but to help you will offer up two 
illuminating examples, one historically true, the other a hard test case 
philosopher’s conundrum.
What is virtue ethics? Example 1
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A moral virtue is an inner disposition or trait of character to act morally. 
Virtue is often construed as a corrective, meaning that most if not all 
virtues counteract some problem thought to be inherent in the human 
condition. So we honour and seek to display, say, the virtue of moral 
courage and fortitude in the face of adversity and personal psychological 
or physical fear. People may have read about the so called female ‘Oscar 
Schindler’, Irena Sendler, a Polish social worker who helped rescue 
2500 Jewish children out of the Warsaw ghetto. She persuaded mothers 
to give up their toddlers and by various means took these children to 
safety, until she was betrayed, captured, tortured, sentenced to death but 
escaped into hiding for the rest of the war. She died in a nursing home 
in May 2008, aged 98 (see article in PSW July 2008). She described her 
acts of heroism over 60 years ago as ‘a normal thing to do’. ‘I saw the 
Polish nation drowning. And those in the most diffi cult position were 
the Jews. And among them those most vulnerable were the children. 
So I had to help.’ She rejected the term hero. ‘The term irritates me 
greatly. The opposite is true – I continue to have qualms of conscience 
that I did so little I could have done more. This regret will follow me 
to my death. Every child saved with my help is the justifi cation of my 
existence on this earth and not a title to glory.’
I don’t know if Irene Sendler was especially religious or even spiritual 
although she was born a Roman Catholic. I really have no idea as to her 
inner motivation but she was in my view a person of great virtue, an 
exemplar of moral courage driven by compassion, justice, endurance 
and perseverance, not to mention a person of many practical and even 
intellectual problem solving skills needed to be successful. I fl ag up 
here a link between moral capacity, intellectual understanding and 
purposefulness, capability and practical problem solving. What does 
Kantian or Utilitarian ethics have to say about all this? Not much, in 
my view.
What is virtue ethics? Example 2
I will try to simplify the shocking richness and oral complexity of a 
real story such as Sendler’s with a simplifi ed hypothetical one, to begin 
to explain VE by way of an illustration which I borrow from Stocker 
in his classic article ‘The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories’ 
( Journal of Philosophy,1976, 14, 453-66) It entails the peculiar notion 
of ‘self-effacement’.
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Stocker’s self-effacing hospital visit and a simple ethical story
You are recovering in hospital and your friend visits. In the course of 
the visit it becomes clear that the motive for visiting is to:
• Obediently conform to an abstract rule by doing one’s duty; or
• Instrumentally, calculatedly, bring about the best available state of 
affairs; or
• Simply express friendship and being a friend
There are three sorts of ethical goods here. The fi rst is associated 
with deontological ethical theory and the second with consequentialist 
ethical theory, two paradigms that have dominated social work values 
and theory. The third is equated with VE which is only just emerging 
in mainstream ethical debate in social work as a different perspective.
An ethical theory may be ‘self-effacing’. Consider deontic duty 
theories. Let’s say that the principle here is something like: when a 
friend is in hospital you don’t go to the pub even though you may 
prefer to but make a point of going to the hospital. You sacrifi ce your 
own preferences, what you actually want to do, for supplication to the 
principle. But if I actually really don’t want to come and see my friend in 
hospital but act out of some abstract sense of obligation, just what sort 
of real friend am I? Isn’t friendship about just being there for another 
as the situation demands? I am being obedient and supplicant to the 
general principle, not loyal to that particular person. How would you 
feel if your visitor said on arrival it’s good to see you because this way 
I am glad to have followed a duty or obligation and therefore I have 
acted morally and done the right thing?
Now consider a consequentialist approach. Suppose I calculate that all 
things considered I can maximise overall happiness of all by visiting. That 
is to say, I work out that I do more good in visiting than not visiting by 
some criterion of goodness. That’s OK but what if my calculation comes to a 
different prediction? Moreover, is it OK? How would you feel if your visitor 
said I’m so glad to see you because I have calculated that in doing so I have 
maximised some criteria of happiness and hence I have acted morally. In 
both these paradigms the person in distress simply disappears from the 
moral equation, both the moral agent and the recipient of the moral action. 
If I want to hang on to the centrality of that person in this moral transaction, 
my centrality as a moral agent, and be motivated by her distress, not rules, 
then these sort of theories must ultimately appeal to other ethical criteria 
to rediscover that person and myself. An ethical theory is self-effacing if 
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its premises do not serve as motives for action according to the theory 
itself and we loose sight of the other person. To save face but to preserve 
the theory I think deontologists and consequentialists are committed to 
saying something like this:
• moral rules are such that sometimes in order to follow them the 
agent must be moved by considerations other than that of following 
the rules; or
• that the best consequences will be brought about by people who 
are not motivated to bring about best consequences and hence 
there sometimes is good consequentialist reason not to recommend 
consequentialist motives
What we value in social work is the person (or her family) in distress, 
not abstract ethical systems.
Let us assume that a hospital visit is an example of the most basic 
primordial ethical encounter, ontological altruism, the recognition of 
someone’s distress and our ethical impulse to comfort because of the 
sheer fact of that distress. In reaching out and acting morally towards 
another person, to somehow share her distress, I am being a moral 
person: in one sense I myself can only fl ourish as a human being if I 
attend to the fl ourishing of another who is not fl ourishing. Not to visit 
my sick friend is not just to diminish her but myself as well. I don’t need 
to obey deontic rules to be myself; I don’t need some calculation rule of 
utility: both are on pain of implausibility the ethical negation of myself 
and the other. When we apply deontic rules or calculations of utility to 
a situation, we are not actually there, ethically present at all. But that is 
what social work has become – ethically implausible and self-effacing, 
an ethical non-presence or ethical simulacra. Our practice is regulated 
by codes, systems, procedures, cost calculations, and governmentality. 
The person – myself, the other – has disappeared.
Which ethical scenario best captures the Irene Sendler story? 
Was she motivated by duty, (obeying a rule), or consequences (that 
she acted in accordance with some calculation of utility), or some 
ontological friendship or altruism (an ethic of recognition, identity and 
responsibility, a meeting of and response to the needy and endangered, 
articulated through a discourse of security and safety metaphors)?
The social work moral impulse and gaze entails deep: respect -to 
look at and to recognise an other’s humanity, to suffer alongside and 
with. Respect – from ‘spectacle’ and ‘spectator’- is to see the person, 
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not the application of cold rules. To see the other in their fullness and 
humanity, to restore her to human fullness as far as possible is the 
telos of social work. It is to be contrasted with the rationalist deductive 
scientifi c technical models of ‘modernism’. I offer, then, secular VE as 
an alternative discourse vehicle to reclaim our lost identity.
Virtue ethics: features
For me, virtues are ‘dispositions of the soul’ that make it possible 
for us to think, feel, reason and act in an appropriate way. They are 
a combination of affect and reason which equals moral action. VE is 
a conceptual cousin of an ethics of care or an ethics of compassion 
but privileges moral character through a mutually affi rming self-other 
dialogue, that is to say, your well being is also my well being. Note 
Irena Sendler’s critical self evaluation ‘I could have done more’. On this 
account she had not fully realised herself. We don’t just do what we 
have to do but go beyond the call of duty.
Virtues are moral excellences that dwell within us. They confer 
strength of purpose in recognising, evaluating and responding to life’s 
vicissitudes and the realisation of the good life. A typical defi nition of 
a virtue in effect identifi es it as a personality trait that is a disposition 
to act, to desire and to feel that involves the exercise of judgment 
and leads to a recognisable human excellence or instance of human 
fl ourishing. Irena Sendler fl ourished as a moral person even though 
she faced death; not to do what she did was not to fl ourish. VE is a 
theoretical perspective which holds that judgments about the inner lives 
of individuals (their traits, motives, dispositions and character) rather 
than judgments about the rightness or wrongness of external acts and/
or consequences of acts are of the greatest moral importance (Louden, 
1998). We do not admire Irena Sendler any less because she only saved 
2500 children and maybe could have saved three thousand. We all 
identify with the hospital visitor who came out of friendship and what 
friendship entails. We don’t actually measure a person’s moral worth 
using the tools of modernity.
Here are some common responsive moral dispositions or associated 
character traits in recognition of the other. They refl ect both other- 
and self- regarding ethical goods that benefi t both the possessor and 
recipient:
kindness, felicity, benevolence, generosity, empathy, magnanimity, 
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compassion, care, tenderness, trustworthiness, loyalty, discernment, 
truthfulness, integrity, sincerity, conscientiousness, fairness, justice, 
patience, diligence, reliability, fortitude, courage, prudence, perseverance, 
hope, and so on .
These are stable enduring global characteristics that enable us to 
perceive and shape ethical responses in any ethically charged situation 
and to work with and alongside our clients. Virtuous activity involves 
choosing virtue for itself in light of a justifi able life plan. A virtue is 
the property of the whole person and the life that person leads. The 
question becomes not what is it to do social work but what is it to be a 
social worker. Social work is a characteristically virtuous activity built 
around a life plan and commitment to promoting the fl ourishing of 
others (and hence myself qua social worker) in social work situations, 
our distinctive domain full of safety, security and care metaphors. I 
do not act benevolently in order to be benevolent (a deontic rule) or 
to be seen to be benevolent by myself or others (moral reputation); or 
even to produce benevolence (calculated outcome). I act benevolently 
because the situation I face fi ts a description of a situation that elicits my 
benevolence and my suitably disposed character recognises it as such.
Three VE propositions and some discussion points. Consider the following
1. Slote: an action is right if and only if it exhibits or expresses a 
virtuous (or admirable) motive or at least does not exhibit a viscous 
(or deplorable) one;
2. Hursthouse: an act is right if and only if it is what a virtuous 
agent would not just do but characteristically would do in the 
circumstances;
3. Swanton: an action is right if and only if it acknowledges or responds 
to items in the fi eld of virtue in an excellent or good enough way.
Consider Motivation
Aristotle (Nichomachean ethics) asserts that:
• Every art and every enquiry and similarly every action is thought 
to aim at some good and for this reason the good has been declared 
that at which all things aim;
• The good aimed at varies with each art and activity;
• The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper function;
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• Certain virtues or excellences make a person good and make that 
person do her work well.
Apply this to the ethical social work role
(Adapted from Jane Green 2008, paper presented to Edinburgh 
Conference:‘Towards Practice Wisdom’).
A morally charged social worker:
• has an abiding interest in the telos – the main goal or purpose or 
good – of her métier;
• pursues the characteristic good of that métier with creativity and 
moral imagination;
• has a particular responsibleness with respect to the goals of that 
métier;
• thinks of these goals as belonging within a larger context that makes 
such ends worth pursuing and worth society’s having her pursue.
A social work practice of value is based on:
An ethical career that aims at the good or well being of its clients and 
hence there are certain virtues which help the social worker realise that 
purpose and to become and remain a social worker. Her métier is the 
care, protection and security of those whose care, safety and security 
are endangered at any given point in life stages, within her distinctive 
socially mandated domain.
Virtue theory therefore has much in common with spiritual perspectives 
in that it makes for a transcendent ethical imagination in a commitment 
to distressed others and assuaging their discomforts. In stressing 
motivational factors grounded in caring and compassionate inner 
dispositions towards helping others it foregrounds the traditional values 
of social work. There is much productive dialogue to be had between 
the two perspectives.
